Officials in several states are monitoring their electronic voting systems closely in this year’s primaries after learning that some machines are vulnerable to manipulation. The concern illustrates that achieving electronic security requires patient thought and analysis. Thankfully, the National Research Council, ACCURATE, NIST, and others are leading the way forward.

As electronic voting systems debuted in Utah on June 27, researchers continue to explore their security. A report from the Brennan Center at NYU uses a hypothetical scenario to examine potential threats, while a Common Cause study explores the vulnerability of direct recording electronic (DRE) machines.

With the ink barely dry on the 2006 election results, experts have begun to investigate potential reforms. Researchers at NIST lay out suggestions for improving voting machine software, while others explore the specific causes of the problems in Florida’s 13th Congressional District.

The controversy over the EAC’s decision to bar Ciber, Inc. from approving new voting systems has brought attention to the issue of testing and certification. The EAC has authorized a program to handle these functions, but scholars have argued that the new initiative does not go far enough. Some states, meanwhile, have developed their own solutions to these problems.

As Congress and the states continue to wrestle with issues related to electronic voting machines, new Congressional testimony from the GAO and a new audit of the 2006 election in Cuyahoga County, Ohio highlight the value of collaboration in tackling these problems.

Compared to issues like paper trails and system security, ballot design has largely flown under the radar in the public debate over voting technology. Researchers, however, are exploring design issues in depth; this week, two teams summarize some of their important findings.

On February 5, voters in 15 states arrived at polls for presidential primaries and find a wide variety of voting equipment. A new book explores a wide range of questions about how voters interact with their voting systems, while the Center for American Politics and Citizenship’s web site makes available a range of earlier research by the book’s authors.

Election officials may be concerned about the security and accuracy of their systems in the short-term, but the EAC has been considering new guidelines that will affect voting systems far into the future. A task force of the Election Reform Project has issued a set of recommendations on improving these guidelines, and the EAC also recently held a roundtable discussion on the document.

Though they may lack the drama of the Minnesota recount, jurisdictions nationwide have been doing their own post-election assessments in the form of manual audits. A report from the League of Women Voters makes suggestions for how audits should be conducted, while NIST has issued recommendations on possible changes to the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines to make auditability, rather than software independence, a central requirement.

The ongoing debate over the role of technology in elections has provoked a great deal of research on the topic. A recent conference on voting technology featured 11 papers examining evidence in a number of countries and a new working paper discusses the current state of research and development in voting technology.

We launched the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project in June 2005 with the encouragement and financial support of the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. Five years later we bring the project to a close. We take this opportunity to reflect on the state of election administration in the United States almost a decade after the extended and controversial Florida vote count in the 2000 presidential election and suggest how additional changes in technology, election law and administrative practices might further strengthen American elections in the years ahead.