Ted Selker (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project)

March 2008

In 2004, the Chairman of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) requested that the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (VTP) produce a list of steps that could improve the presidential election process. Its success motivated this exercise again for 2008. Below are eight easy-to-implement steps to avoid lost votes and inaccurate ballots that can be acted on in time for 2008.

1. Work with the United States Postal Service, Secretaries of State, and election officials to eliminate folds in optical scan ballots.

Many jurisdictions mail their absentee optical scan ballots folded to fit in small envelopes. Folds in optical scan ballots cause many problems for scanners. Historically the folds are not set at print time. When folds are added later, they can occur on ballot marking spaces and cause misreads. As well, if timing marks occur on the fold, they can be misread causing misreads of more of the ballot. Care and testing in ballot design and printing are crucial.

In addition to not reading correctly, folded ballots regularly jam scanners and ballot boxes. When folded ballots are put into optical scanners, they don't stack correctly. This causes pollworkers to open ballot boxes during counting and to store them outside the ballot box. We have seen both the restacking and the day of election storing done in many insecure ways in various jurisdictions. The process of handling ballots always has the possibility of introducing problems and even fraud.

Many times, ballots are folded in preparation for mailing them as absentee ballots. They are folded because many election officials believe that mailing an unfolded ballot would be too costly. But in an era when much junk mail arrives to our homes in full-sized envelopes, it should be possible to get reasonable rates for the sake of improved accuracy in vote counting.^[1]

2. Make sample ballots and sample ballot preparation areas available in all polling places.

Giving voters a sample ballot to fill in and bring into the polling booth acts as a memory aid. In experiments, voters who enter the poll booth with their own sample ballots (or any list of races and selections) make fewer errors. At least 6.5 percent of registered voters have short-term memory loss and at least 14 percent of registered voters have reading disabilities.^[2] For the large number of people with cognitive disabilities, the sample ballot would make an even greater difference.

3. All jurisdictions should require voting preparation audits.

All elections involve election material creation, distribution, polling place management, and election material delivery. All of these processes, in combination, should be audited using an established statistical basis for proving that the voting systems are clean. Such an audit helps to find problems ahead of time, and helps eliminate the kind of ad hoc day-of-election solutions that are prevalent in many polling places.

4. Eliminate mark-sense style optical scanners.

A common type of voting technology used in the US is the so-called "mark-sense" style optical scanner, with which voters place a prescribed mark on a ballot using a writing instrument. When the mark-sense scanner sees the mark in a particular place, it compares the document with a ballot module containing the names of the races, candidates, and the election information.

A competing type of optical scan system is the optical character recognition (OCR) scanner, a standard in some countries and available from one vendor in the United States.^[3] Scanners using this approach capture the selection and layout from the actual physical ballot used by the voter. The OCR scanner interprets the voter's marks and election information, and stores the ballot image for future audits as needed. OCR scanners eliminate several common points of error and opportunities for fraud possible with mark-sense scanners. They eliminate the need for a ballot module definition in the scanner that corresponds to the precinct ballot being scanned. Eliminating the ballot module eliminates the possibility of errors and fraud because of a mismatch between what the voter sees and what the scanner interprets. In addition, OCR scanning systems eliminate calibration errors that would incorrectly associate marks with selections. They eliminate the possibility of incorrectly printed calibration bars causing selections to go unrecorded. They can recognize and identify folds without changing calibration or identifying them as a mark. Lastly, in the case of highly contested races -- such as the Washington State Governor's race in 2006 -- OCR systems leave three auditable records to allow election officials to know exactly which ballots were added or changed: the ballot, the image, and its OCR interpretation.

5. Plan and execute secure backup strategies.

As a secure backup strategy, all electronic records should be copied before machines go online. Every counting operation should make backup copies of all electronic records including election night counts and store them offsite. This surprisingly overlooked step is valuable in the event of physical or electronic catastrophes.

6. Optical scan ballots should be administered with magnifying straight edges.



Magnifying straight edges let people line up selection names with the places on an optical scan ballot to make a mark. It is currently believed that at least .5 percent^[4] of voters' marks are made for the selection next to the one intended. The magnifying straight edges could help everyone make fewer mistakes by helping them keep track of what they are doing. In particular, they would help the large class of people with sight impairment and many kinds of cognitive disabilities.

7. Implement the two-lock rule for handling all voting materials.

Every part of the election process should require more than one observer. Westchester County, NY is an example of a jurisdiction that puts two locks on the secure ballot storage room, requiring a representative from each party to be present with a key whenever voting records are reviewed.

"Two lock" security also increases the focus on who has access to voting records. Professional computer programmers involved in the election process, for example, could present a security risk on election day. Anyone involved in election operations should be required sign an affidavit as to whether they are trained and knowledgeable in computer administration. Those knowledgeable in computer administration should not be allowed to be the primary operator of electronic voting systems on Election Day.

8. Voters using DRE election voting machines should be encouraged to wear headphones.

Caltech/MIT VTP experiments indicate that voters find significantly more errors on their ballots^[5] if they have audio feedback as they vote. Most modern Direct Record Electronic voting machines and electronic ballot marking machines used in the US include audio only for special-needs voting. Allowing machines to speak the selections to everyone as they make their choices would not require changes to many of the systems. Earphones on these machines should be made available to all voters, as they already are for people with special needs. This simple protocol could eliminate many lost votes in each election. We expect it will especially help the large class of people with cognitive disabilities.

Ted Selker is the Co-Director of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project and an Associate Professor of Media Arts and Sciences at MIT.

Viewpoint is an occasional feature analyzing various election reform issues.

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